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The NBA Strategy of Broadcast 
Television Exposure: A Legal Application 
John A. Fortunato, Ph.D.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Sports television is a unique form of broadcasting compared to 
other programming genres because of the relationship between a 
professional sports league and a broadcast network.  The most 
unique characteristic of sports television is that a league and a 
television network sign a multi-year contract for broadcasting rights.  
Television networks pay large sums of money1 to a sports league for 
the rights to broadcast a certain number of games over a certain 
number of years.  The television network then sells the commercial 
time during these games to advertisers.  This unique relationship 
exists because a sports league is granted permission by the federal 
government through the Sports Broadcasting Act (hereinafter 
SBA),2 to act as a cartel and collectively package and sell the 
broadcast rights of its games to television networks.  Professional 
sports leagues reap their greatest economic rewards and gain their 
most significant exposure source through network television 
contracts. 
 The exposure of nationally televised National Basketball 
Association (hereinafter NBA) games, however, must be properly 
maintained so the value of the NBA broadcast rights remain high.  
The government once again is vital in permitting the NBA to 
maintain control over national television exposure as evidenced in 
Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship and WGN Contl Broad. Co.  v. 
 
*  Assistant Professor, Department of Advertising, College of Communications, University 
of Texas at Austin; Ph.D. Rutgers University. 
 1 The NBAs four-year, $2.6 billion television contracts with NBC and Turner 
Broadcasting expire after the 2001-02 season.  Some speculate that Michael Jordans return 
will make the next NBA contract worth as much as 50 percent more.  Terry Lefton, Sports: 
The NBAs Digital Rebound, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD MAGAZINE, June 25, 2001, available 
at http://www.thestandard.net/article/0,1902,27219,00.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001). 
 2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1961). 
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NBA,3 which provides a justification for how the NBA, as a league-
wide collective, and not individual teams, controls the national 
television exposure of league games. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Literature regarding sports leagues and government, and sports 
leagues and television networks provides insight into these complex 
relationships.  In examining government and sports, Noll4 comments 
that [v]irtually every major public policy toward business
antitrust, labor relations, taxation, even the constitutional prohibition 
against slaveryhas a potentially significant application to sports.5  
While Noll makes a valid point of applying public policy toward 
sports, the provisions of the Sports Broadcasting Act and Chicago 
Profl Sports Ltd. Pship and WGN Contl Broad. Co. v. NBA6 allow 
the NBA to benefit both monetarily and exposure-wise from its 
control of league television coverage. 
 Parente7 points out that [t]elevision was relatively unimportant to 
sports until the end of the 1950s when organized professional team 
sports began to look at television as a potential major source of 
revenue.8  Parente also claims that once a sport, league, or team 
has had its product bought by television for use as programming, 
 
 3 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 4 Roger G. Noll is a professor of public policy at Stanford University.  Professor Nolls 
principle area of interest is public policies towards business.  Noll has authored or co-
authored 11 books and over 250 articles in areas such as telecommunications policy, 
federally supported research and development, environmental policy, and the management 
of universities.  California Council on Science and Technology Council Member profiles at 
http://www.sdsc.edu/ccst/ccst/about/council/noll.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001). 
 5 ROGER G. NOLL, GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 1 (The Brookings 
Institute) (1974). 
 6 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 7 Donald Parente is an associate professor of advertising at Middle Tennessee State 
University.  Dr. Parentes research interests include the way advertising professionals write 
objectives, advertising campaign strategy and sports management.  Middle Tennessee State 
University faculty profiles at http://www.mtsu.edu/~jour/advertis/faculty.html (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2001). 
 8 Donald E. Parente, The Interdependence of Sports and Television, 27 J. 
Communication No. 3, 128, 129 (1977). 
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that entity can seldom exist thereafter, at least in the same style or 
manner, without the financial support of television.9  McChesney10 
claims that successful management of professional sports leagues 
and franchises is based on the capacity to best exploit rights 
payments.11  Bellamy12 concludes that television could survive 
without professional sports, but professional sports could not exist in 
their present form without television monies.13  Network television 
contracts have become the largest source of revenue for sports 
franchises. 
 Network television also provides the most important exposure 
vehicle for a professional sports league.  Wenner14 points out that the 
most common involvement people have with sports is through 
viewing games on television.15  Lever16 and Wheeler17 also claim 
 
 9 Id. at 128. 
 10 Robert W. McChesney is Research Professor in the Institute of Communications 
Research and the Graduate School of Library and Information Science at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  His work concentrates on the history and political economy 
of communication, emphasizing the role media play in democratic and capitalist societies.  
Robert W. McChesney personal biography at http://www.robertmcchesney.com/Bio.html 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2001). 
 11 Robert W. McChesney, Media Made Sport: A History of Sports Coverage in the 
United States, in MEDIA, SPORTS, AND SOCIETY 65 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed., 1989). 
 12 Robert V. Bellamy, Jr. is Associate Professor of Mass Communication & Society at 
Duquesne University.  Duquesne University personal home page directory at 
http://www2.duq.edu/DUHP/HomePage.cfm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
 13 Robert V. Bellamy, Jr., Professional Sports Organizations: Media Strategies, in 
MEDIA, SPORTS, AND SOCIETY 120 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed., 1989). 
 14 Lawrence A. Wenner is Professor of Communications at the University of San 
Francisco.  Dr. Wenners areas of interest include [m]edia and sport; media criticism; 
media audience; media and commodification of culture; constructions of race, ethnicity, and 
gender in media.  University of San Francisco faculty profile at 
http://www.usfca.edu/asfaculty/wenner.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
 15 Lawrence A. Wenner, Media, Sports, and Society: The Research Agenda, in MEDIA, 
SPORTS, AND SOCIETY 15 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed., 1989). 
 16 Janet Lever is an Associate Professor of Sociology at California State Los Angeles.  
Dr. Lever is an expert on leisure studies, applied sociology, gender, and the social 
consequences of human sexuality.  California State Los Angeles News Releases at 
http://www.calstatela.edu/univ/ppa/newsrel/pitch17.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001). 
 17 Stanton Wheeler is the Ford Foundation Professor of Law and the Social Sciences at 
Yale Law School.  Dr. Wheelers teaching and research interests include the sociology of 
law, deviant behavior and social control, and socio-legal aspects of popular culture, 
including sports and music.  Yale University Institution for Social and Political Studies 
faculty profile at http://www.yale.edu/isps/faculty/Wheeler.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2001). 
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that the single most dominant influence on the way in which sport is 
experienced in American society is that of the mass media, 
particularly television.18 
 With the importance of network television to a professional sports 
league established, the purpose of this article is to provide a legal 
application to the broadcast television exposure strategy of the NBA, 
as it is the government that permits the professional sports and 
television network relationship to exist and the national television 
exposure strategy of the NBA to flourish.  Description and analysis 
of the SBA and Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship and WGN Contl 
Broad. Co.  v. NBA will help answer the following research question: 
what is the federal governments philosophy regarding sports 
broadcasting on network television?  In addition to a description and 
analysis of these government provisions, key informant interviews 
are utilized to provide depth into the NBA strategy that results from 
the permission granted through these governmental provisions.  
Personal interviews were conducted with: Dave Checketts, former 
President and CEO of Madison Square Garden; Ed Desser, President 
of NBA Television & New Media Ventures; Brian McIntyre, NBA 
Senior Vice President of Communications; Mike Pearl, Senior Vice 
President and Executive Producer of Turner Sports; Tommy Roy, 
NBC Sports Executive Producer; and David Stern, NBA 
Commissioner. 
III. FINDINGS 
 In the situation of sports broadcasting, the professional sports 
leagues initiated federal government involvement in trying to gain 
exceptional government approval to collectively package and sell the 
broadcast rights for their games to television networks.  The selling 
of rights fees for games to television broadcasters was originally a 
major point of contention between league and television executive 
personnel regarding televisions impact on game attendance and 
separate franchises selling their individual broadcast rights, 
 
 18 Janet Lever & Stanton Wheeler, Mass Media and the Experience of Sport, 20 
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 125 (1993). 
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potentially creating an economic imbalance among all teams within a 
league.19  Horowitz points out that [t]he prospect of significant 
broadcast revenues, and the threat that broadcasts would adversely 
affect attendance, led to the adoption of rules in each sport that 
restricted inter-team competition for the sale of broadcast rights.20  
These rules became a force behind several antitrust suits surrounding 
laws of broadcast policy. 
A. Antitrust Issues 
 The first antitrust issue was raised in 1946, when major league 
baseball adopted a rule prohibiting one team from broadcasting a 
game in another teams home territory or from another stadium 
without the home teams consent.21  Fearing the creation of a system 
that would not permit open competition, the Department of Justice 
became involved in the settlement of this antitrust issue.  Many of 
the early sports broadcast suits dealt with the televising of the 
National Football League (hereinafter NFL) and on October 9, 
1951, the Department of Justice filed suit against the NFL.22 
 In United States v. Natl Football League,23 Judge Allan K. Grim 
decided to uphold the legality of the NFL bylaw, which prevented 
the telecasting of an outside game in a third teams home territory 
when that team had a home game.24  For example, a football game 
between the Chicago Bears and the Green Bay Packers could not be 
televised into the New York market if the New York Giants were 
playing a home game.  This ruling would in effect allocate marketing 
territories for the purpose of restricting competition.  Horowitz points 
out that the court found that such a restraint was reasonable because 
of the adverse effects that competitive outside telecasts would be 
 
 19 See Ira Horowitz, Sports Broadcasting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 
275, 275-83 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974). 
 20 Id. at 279. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 281. 
 23 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
 24 See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 281. 
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likely to have on the home clubs attendance.25  The Court also 
ruled that because of the mutual interdependence of the franchises, 
the restriction would help preserve the league by protecting the 
weaker teams home attendance.26  The Court did find two illegal 
restrictions on broadcasts: (1) the prohibition against telecasts by 
another team when the home team was also telecasting an away 
game in its home territory, and (2) all restrictions on outside radio 
broadcasts.27 
 The professional sports leagues did not feel that the ruling of the 
Court interfered with the situation where all of the teams could 
collectively bargain as a cartel in negotiations for broadcast rights.28  
Consequently, the NBA and NBC signed the first league-wide 
television agreement in 1954; that year, the first nationally televised 
basketball game between the Boston Celtics and the New York 
Knicks was broadcast on NBC.29  Following television contracts 
between the American Football League and ABC in 1960, and the 
NFL and CBS on April 24, 1961, the NFL brought a petition seeking 
an interpretation of the 1953 ruling in United States v. Natl Football 
League.30  Judge Grim again ruled that by pooling television rights 
the franchises eliminated competition among themselves in the sale 
of these rights.31  Horowitz explains that [t]he [C]ourt also held that 
by granting to CBS the right to determine which games would be 
telecast and where, the agreement violated the 1953 judgment 
enjoining the league from entering into any agreement that could 
tend to restrict broadcast areas.32  The Court therefore deemed the 
NFL-CBS contract to be in violation of the 1953 ruling.33 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 See 116 F. Supp. at 323-24. 
 27 See id. at 330. 
 28 See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 281. 
 29 PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS: LABOR RELATIONS AND THE SPORTS 
BUSINESS 98 (1996). 
 30 196 F. Supp 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
 31 See id. at 447. 
 32 Horowitz, supra note 19, at 283. 
 33 See 196 F. Supp. at 447. 
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B. Sports Broadcasting Act 
 Having failed in the judiciary, the leagues and the networks 
petitioned Congress for permission to pool and sell the broadcast 
rights to television networks.  The result of hearings before the 
House of Representatives was the SBA, which was approved by 
Congress on September 30, 1961.34  The new law simply granted 
clubs in professional sports leagues an antitrust exemption allowing 
them to pool their broadcast rights for the purpose of selling those 
rights to the highest bidder.35  The purpose of the SBA is different 
from that of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (hereinafter Sherman 
Act),36 which is designed to ensure free market competition and 
prevent restriction of trade. 
 The SBA established the legality of the professional sports 
leagues practice of packaging league games to a network and not 
allowing teams to individually sell their rights, which would 
otherwise be an unlawful restraint on competition.  The SBA is, 
however, a special interest legislation, a single-industry exception to 
a law designed for the protection of the public.37 Section 1291 of 
the SBA amended antitrust laws so that they shall not apply to any 
joint agreement by or among persons engaging in or conducting the 
organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, 
or hockey, by which any league of clubs . . . sells or otherwise 
transfers all right or any part of the right of such leagues member 
clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games.38 
 The SBA facilitates the acquisition of network television money 
by professional sports leagues, entitling the leagues to their greatest 
source of revenue.  In its current television broadcast contract signed 
on November 12, 1997, and beginning with the 1998-99 season, the 
NBA once again substantially increased its broadcast rights revenues 
 
 34 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1961). 
 35 See id. 
 36 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1914, 1948). 
 37 Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
 38 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961). 
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to a total of $2.64 billion.39  NBC doubled its payments to a total of 
$1.75 billion (up from $750 million) and Turner more than doubled 
its payments to a total of $890 million (up from $350 million) for a 
four-year contract through the 2001-02 season.40  Tommy Roy, Co-
Executive Producer for the NBA on NBC, describes the professional 
sports league and television network partnership as a cycle where if 
the NBA does well, more people watch the games, which provide 
higher ratings and advertising, and eventually lead to rights fees for 
the league.41 
C. Exposure: The Less is More Strategy 
 In addition to unmatched revenue, television networks provide 
unmatched exposure for a professional sports league.  Brian 
McIntyre, NBA Senior Vice President of Communications, claims 
that the NBA can reach as many people in one broadcast as it can in 
numerous newspapers or local newscasts.42  He characterizes a game 
broadcast, whether it is local or national, as nothing more than a two-
and-a-half-hour infomercial for your product.43  McIntyre explains 
the advantage of a national broadcast, stating:  
local NBC has three-to-four minutes a night on their local 
news.  Multiply that times seven and it is twenty-one to 
twenty-eight minutes a weekone broadcast gives us 
two-and-a-half-to-three hours depending on if you have a 
pre-game and a post-game.  [With] our broadcast partners, 
we are going right to our target audience.    The Finals and 
 
 39 See generally INFOPLEASE.COM, The Rights Stuff: Major sports and their television 
deals as of Sept. 1, 2000, available at: http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0877494.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2001). 
 40 See id. 
 41 Interview with Tommy Roy, Co-Executive Producer, NBA on NBC (Oct. 21, 1998). 
 42 Interview with Brian McIntyre, Senior Vice President of Communications, NBA 
(Dec. 16, 1998). 
 43 Id. 
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the All-Star Game we are going to a bigger audience, 
bringing the casual fans.44 
 While the SBA permits a league as a collective to sell broadcast 
rights for its games to networks, it does not prohibit individual teams 
from entering into their own national television contracts.45  These 
individual team broadcast contracts hinder the leagues control and 
maintenance over national television exposure.  The NBA took 
several measures, including litigation, to limit the rights of individual 
teams to sell games so the league could maximize the value of the 
television rights it sells to the national networks.46 
 During the late 1970s and through the mid-1980s broadcast 
exposure was a major problem for the NBA: few regular season 
games were being broadcast, some playoff games were not being 
broadcast on television, and even some games of the NBA Finals 
were being broadcast on tape delay.47  This exposure problem is 
highlighted by the 1981 NBA Finals between the Boston Celtics and 
the Houston Rockets when four of the six games were broadcast on 
tape delay at 11:30 p.m.48  One of the first initiatives the NBA 
implemented during these years to increase the leagues finances and 
marketability was for the league as a whole to take greater control of 
its television exposure.  Specifically, the league exerted more control 
over the independent franchises that had the capability to get their 
games broadcast on national television superstations.  The NBA 
defined a superstation as any commercial over-the-air television 
station whose broadcast signal is received outside of the local 
Designated Market Area.49  The Atlanta Hawks, Chicago Bulls, and 
New Jersey Nets were three franchises who were able to get their 
games broadcast on the three NBA-recognized superstations: TBS, 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961). 
 46 See infra section Exposure: Superstations and the WGN Lawsuit. 
 47 See generally 754 F. Supp. at 1342. 
 48 See id.; see also Steve Pate, Blast Off!, NBA.COM, available at 
http://global.nba.com/history/1981_rockets.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2001). 
 49 Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship v. Natl Basketball Assn, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1345 
(N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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WGN and WOR respectively.50  The league, along with its broadcast 
partners, can control exposure by creating a programming schedule 
that carefully selects days and times of games and also the players 
and teams who will appear on network television broadcasts. 
 The NBA adopted a less is more strategy where the league 
would better attempt to control the positioning of the NBA on 
television and not saturate the market with games.51  Regarding the 
less is more strategy, NBA Commissioner David Stern states, 
when your ratings are not strong, and your product is not secure in 
its identity, a lot of exposure is not a good thing because the worst 
thing for a bad product is a lot of exposure, and so we were trying to 
shape up our product at the same time that we were trying to define 
exposure.52  Ed Desser, President of NBA Television, also describes 
the rationale behind the less is more philosophy.  He states: 
The market was only ready to accept so much and one of 
the strategies that we were fond of talking about . . . was 
less is more, and less is more was really all about . . . 
not overexpos[ing] ourselves . . . try[ing] to make each 
telecast special.  We are fighting for ratings.  We want our 
ratings to be as high as possible, on average, and therefore 
there is potentially too much exposure.  If you are in a 
battle for your lives and what defines being on network 
television is a twenty share, [the question becomes] how 
do you get a twenty share?  You do a variety of things. . . .  
You dont put too many games on; you [heavily] 
promote . . . the games you do put on; you make sure you 
schedule each game in a logical way; you have good 
matchups, etc.; you produce it well; you have certain 
consistency of scheduling so people can know to expect it; 
maybe you dont have wall-to-wall games so that people 
have to choose [one game over another]; you try and have 
measured amounts of [games] in the marketplace . . . 
push[ing] up the average.  At a time when you are a 
second-class citizen, increasing your average is more 
 
 50 See id. 
 51 See infra notes 52-53. 
 52 Interview with David Stern, Commissioner, NBA (Apr. 14, 1999). 
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important than increasing the total. . . .  What is a more 
attractive thing for a television network, one game that 
gets a ten rating, or five games that get a two rating? . . .  
One game that gets a ten rating, and so we had to control 
the amount of product in the marketplace in order to 
garner enough [viewers] that [advertisers] would pay 
attention.53 
D. Exposure: Superstations and the WGN Lawsuit 
 In 1979, the NBA made its initial attempt to legislate the exposure 
of its game telecasts.  The NBAs Board of Governors adopted a 
resolution that all future television contracts entered into by 
individual teams would be made subject to the Constitution, Bylaws 
and all other rules and regulations of the league, as they presently 
exist and as they may from time to time be amended, subject to the 
terms of any existing or future television contracts entered into by 
the league and subject to review by the Commissioner to guarantee 
compliance.54  The Board of Governors also passed a resolution 
providing the league with the exclusive right to enter into contracts 
for the direct telecasting of NBA games by cable systems located 
outside the territory of all members.55 
 The new resolution voided a national contract the New York 
Knicks had signed with the USA Network, which was to pay the 
Knicks $1.5 million for the broadcast rights to their games for three 
seasons from 1979-80 to 1981-82.56  The NBA continued with their 
less is more strategy restricting exposure, and for the 1980-81 
season teams were limited to forty-one over-the-air telecasts because, 
for example, the Atlanta Hawks for 1979-80 season had broadcast all 
eighty-two of their regular season games on TBS.57  At the time, the 
NBA was not receiving revenue from independent individual team 
 
 53 Interview with Ed Desser, President, NBA Television (Aug. 26, 1998). 
 54 NBA, 754 F. Supp. at 1342. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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broadcast rights contractsonly the Hawks profited from their 
contract with TBS. 
 Teams were still permitted to sell the other forty-one non-network 
games (if they were not on CBSthe national television network for 
the NBA from 1974 to 1990) to a local cable outlet only, and keep all 
of the revenue from whatever contracts they signed.  The NBA 
agreed to broadcast its games on national cable outlets, signing 
contracts for the 1982-83 and 1983-84 season with both ESPN and 
USA for forty games with ESPN televising on Sunday night and 
USA televising on Thursday night.58  The NBA would not allow any 
of these forty-one non-network games to be nationally broadcast 
opposite its new cable partners. 
 The NBA continued to impose restraints on its teams ability to 
broadcast independently on a national network by limiting the 
superstation games to twenty-five for the 1985-86 season.  In 
October 1989, the NBA passed a resolution blacking out 
superstation games on nights when an NBA game is shown 
nationally on cable as part of the leagues national cable package.59  
While individual teams are not permitted to broadcast a game on a 
superstation opposite a TNT or TBS game, teams can air a game 
head to head with a TNT or TBS game, but strictly on a local over-
the-air or local cable channel.  For example, if the New York Knicks 
are playing the Chicago Bulls on TNT, the game could not be 
broadcast nationally on WGN because it is a superstation, but could 
be televised on the Madison Square Garden Network (hereinafter 
MSG), the local carrier for the Knicks.  Games that are televised 
on NBC are not permitted to be broadcast by an individual team 
carrier at all, not even on tape delay.60  For example, if the New York 
Knicks are playing the Chicago Bulls on NBC, neither WGN nor 
MSG would be permitted to broadcast that game live or at any other 
later moment. 
 In 1990, WGN and the Chicago Bulls challenged the NBAs 
attempt to control the television packaging of its product by reducing 
 
 58 754 F. Supp. at 1343. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1344. 
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the number of games on superstations from twenty-five to twenty.  
WGN and the Bulls sued the NBA to have the number remain at 
twenty-five, arguing that the antitrust exemption provided in the 
SBA of 196161 did not apply, and this limit was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.62  The Bulls had approved the Board of Governors 
resolutions for earlier reductions to forty-one and subsequently 
twenty-five games, but moved to block this further restriction.63  At 
the time WGN reached 34% of all of the television households 
nationwide, and 31% of those homes were outside of the Chicago 
area.64  WGN received no money from cable subscription, and 
relying on advertising sales for 98% of its revenues, was losing 
money by not having the Bulls games broadcast to the entire nation.  
The Bulls and WGN also had a successful ratings and advertising 
commodity with the broadcast rights to the most talented and 
marketable playerMichael Jordan. 
 In the early 1990s, WGN and the Bulls also failed to take 
advantage of a tremendous advertising opportunity.  Due to 
microwave transmission technology, a superstation could generate 
two signals, one for local over-the-air, and another to send out to the 
rest of the nation.  Ted Turner had been using this technology of 
splitting the feed with TBS in Atlanta and thus, for one program, had 
the ability to double the advertising revenues with two feeds to sell 
two different sets of advertising: (1) local spots for Atlanta viewers 
only, and (2) national spots which would be seen throughout the 
country.65  While WGN had not been splitting the feed for its Bulls 
telecasts, the superstation had been using this transmission 
technology for its broadcasts of Cubs baseball games.66  For its 
baseball telecasts, WGN offered advertisers three possibilities: (1) 
over-the-air Chicago only, (2) national cable only, or (3) both.67 
 
 61 Id. at 1343. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 1342-43. 
 64 754 F. Supp. at 1348. 
 65 Id. at 1346-47. 
 66 Id. at 1346-47. 
 67 Id. at 1347. 
FINAL.FORTUN 1/10/02  5:07 PM 
146 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:133 
 
E. NBA Position on WGN and Exposure 
 The positioning of the NBA in this legal matter and its rationale 
behind the need to limit the number of national broadcasts on 
superstations refers directly back to the main benefits a league 
achieves when it signs a national television contract: revenue and the 
proper exposure.  The NBA was not receiving any revenue or 
exposure from the contract between the Bulls and WGN.  The beliefs 
of the NBA were clearly spelled out in the Proposed Findings of Fact 
and the Proposed Findings of Law that were filed by the NBA and 
cited in the case.68  The extensive rationale of the NBAs argument 
is: 
The reduction protects the teams grant of exclusivity in 
their local markets, and enhances  the value of the teams 
local television contracts by protecting the exclusivity of 
those contracts from dilution caused by the importation of 
games from other NBA cities by  reason of superstation 
telecasts.   It  also  promotes  the teams media and 
sponsor relationships.  It protects the value of the market 
extension agreements pursuant to  which cable systems 
pay a fee shared equally by all NBA teams for the right to 
telecast local cable games in a teams extended market.  It 
enhances the ability of the NBA to  grant exclusive and 
lucrative national broadcast contracts and protects the 
value of those  contracts.  It ensures the league is 
compensated for all national exposure of its games.  It 
preserves the price sponsors pay for national exposure on 
NBA national cablecasts and  broadcasts.  It promotes the 
NBAs relationship with the national broadcast and cable 
networks.  It enhances the perception in the marketplace 
that the NBA offers a unique  product and has control over 
that product.  It fosters the development by the NBA of 
new technologies.  It improves the level of competition in 
the television market and benefits  consumers by making 
the NBA a stronger competitor and by providing greater 
national network coverage of NBA games.  And in the 
 
 68 Id. at 1358-59. 
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long run, if the NBA as a league has no  right to regulate 
the national distribution of NBA games by individual 
teams, the attractiveness of the leagues national television 
product   will   be   undermined,   its   national   and local 
revenues will decline, the weaker teams will face financial 
difficulties, and the leagues future will be threatened.69 
 The NBA also believed that its position was viable under the 
Sherman Act because the reduction of games actually promotes 
competition between the NBAs network packages and other 
network programming and between local NBA broadcasts by the 
teams and other local programming.70 
F. Ruling 
 Seven weeks after the complaint was filed by WGN and after a 
five-day trial, Judge Hubert Will, a federal district court judge in 
Chicago, ruled in favor of WGN and the Bulls.71  Judge Will ruled 
that because the games sold to WGN were owned and transferred 
by the Bulls rather than the league, the SBA does not, by its terms, 
cover this case.72  Judge Will continued the Bulls and the other 
teams still own and control the rights to the games not included in 
the leagues contracts with NBC and TNT, and therein lies the 
NBAs vulnerability to this lawsuit.73  The Court ruled that the 
NBA produced no credible evidence, anecdotal or statistical, that 
inclined the Court to believe that superstation broadcasts steal 
viewers from another teams local telecasts, damaging ratings and 
revenues.74  The Court also found the arguments of the NBA under 
the Sherman Act75 invalid because the Act prohibits every contract, 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.76 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 754 F. Supp. at 1359. 
 71 Id. at 1351. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 1351-52. 
 74 Id. at 1359. 
 75 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1914, 1948) 
 76 Id. at 1351. 
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 The ruling in favor of WGN and the Bulls did not end the litigation 
between the NBA and WGN.  The original ruling was reaffirmed on 
appeal in Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship and WGN Contl Broad. 
Co.  v. NBA.77  In 1993, the NBA attempted to adopt rules which 
would ban superstation telecasts.  In 1995, Judge Will ruled that the 
NBA plan was an antitrust violation and that WGN and the Bulls 
would pay the NBA $40,000, rather than the $100,000 the NBA had 
sought, for each game the Bulls broadcast outside of Chicago.78  The 
ruling by Judge Will was largely based on the fact that the NBA was 
already receiving more than $2 million a year in copyright payments 
for Bulls games on WGN.  On September 10, 1996, the Seventh 
Circuit79 banned WGN from airing Bulls games nationally claiming 
that the federal judge had overstepped his bounds in 1995 in his 
favorable ruling for WGN.80 
 One notable aspect of the original lawsuit and its appeal was that it 
showed the NBA would assert its right to control its product through 
the SBA.  The league was not anxious for any competition with its 
other national broadcasts and did not want games being broadcast 
nationally without the league receiving any of the revenues.  Because 
the Hawks had reduced their TBS schedule to twenty gamesTBS 
signed an agreement not to challenge any reduction in the number of 
superstation telecasts providing the rules applied equally to all 
superstations with the NBA in attempting to acquire the national 
television contract from ESPN and USA to TNT, also owned by Ted 
Turnerand because the Nets were well below that figure with only 
six games on superstation WOR, the entire WGN lawsuits amounted 
to a dispute over the broadcasting of five games on the surface; but 
the message of the need for the proper exposure and the impact that 
the proper exposure had on national television revenue was clear.  
The doggedness of the NBA in litigation also sent an unequivocal 
message to all NBA franchises who might attempt to challenge the 
leagues national television exposure structure. 
 
 77 NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 78 Jim McConnville, WGN-TV/NBA Headed Back to Court in 6-Year-Old Case; 
Superstation Will Not Be Allowed To Broadcast Bulls Games During this Round of 
Litigation, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 21, 1996, at 45. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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 Ed Desser, President of NBA Television, describes the NBA 
response to the WGN lawsuits stating, we (the NBA) have an 
overall strategy, an overall arrangement where teams exploit local 
rights and the league exploits national and international rights on 
behalf of all the teams collectively.81  Brian McIntyre, NBA Senior 
Vice President of Communications, describes the problems that arise 
when there is a system where superstations are broadcasting at their 
own volition and not that of the league.  McIntyre states, it is our 
(the NBAs) property, the questions are How do we best position 
it?  How do we best project our image?  And there is no doubt that 
television plays a major role in this.  [There was] no money coming 
into the league, instead it was going right to one team, and killing 
any kind of national exposure potential.82 
G. NBA Exposure Strategy 
 As a result of the NBA efforts through the WGN case, the league, 
and not individual teams, has control over all of its national 
television exposure.  Once the league has permission granted by the 
government for economic and exposure control over its product, the 
NBA along with its broadcast partners can determine how to best 
present the league in terms of placement of the schedule and which 
teams and players to televise.  TNT broadcasts NBA games twice a 
week and TBS broadcasts once a week during the regular season.83  
NBC begins its NBA broadcast schedule with a prime-time 
doubleheader on Christmas night and televises NBA games at least 
every Sunday from the end of January through the playoffs.84  All 
NBA broadcast partners increase the number of game telecasts 
during the playoffs.  The preference of network television in 
scheduling league games is still a prevalent strategy employed by the 
NBA.  As the largest revenue source for the NBA and to preserve the 
 
 81 Desser, supra note 53. 
 82 McIntyre, supra note 42. 
 83 See generally NBA NATIONAL TV SCHEDULE, available at: 
http://www.nba.com/schedules/national_tv_schedule/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2001). 
 84 See id. 
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lucrative broadcast income, television networks need to broadcast the 
best games that will achieve the highest audience ratings and 
advertising dollars.  To demonstrate the importance of the network 
television schedule, the overall NBA game schedule is composed 
after the national television schedule is arranged. 
 The broadcast partners are always involved in formulating the 
NBA season and television schedule.  NBC and Turner have input in 
the initial drafts of the schedule of games that will be on their 
networks and the times that the games will be played.  Mike Pearl, 
the Senior Vice President and Executive Producer for Turner Sports, 
states that Turner submits a best wish list of games to the NBA and 
the league uses that input when making its scheduling decisions.85  
This negotiation of the program schedule is where the strength of the 
relationship between the NBA and its broadcast partners can easily 
be recognized; the national television broadcasts are the best 
opportunity to showcase the league from the NBA perspective, and 
the networks simply want the most popular game.  Commissioner 
Stern explains that we used to be much more insistent that every 
team be represented a certain amount, and frankly we have been 
more open to the networks strategic view, which is the way to grow 
the sport is to focus on those teams that people want to see.86  Ed 
Desser describes in detail the scheduling of the NBA in terms of the 
preference that is given to its broadcast partners: 
It starts with kind of a basic framework that is negotiated 
as part of the television agreement.  We dont know what 
the games will be, but there are basic parameters of how 
many regular season, how many Sunday afternoon, how 
many Sunday prime-time [games there will be]. . . .  The 
next [step] is actually putting together the schedule for the 
particular year, and that is put together based upon 
accumulating building availability dates, and NBC and 
Turner scheduling availability dates.  There are a 
[number] of place holders on their schedule for the NBA 
 
 85 Telephone Interview with Mike Pearl, Senior Vice President & Executive Producer, 
Turner Sports (Feb. 25, 1999). 
 86 Stern, supra note 52. 
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on NBC [in] a particular pattern.  Generally speaking, 
most Sundays are now formatted in a triple-header format.  
There are a fair number of deviations, so there are some 
single-headers during the NCAA Tournament and there 
are some split doubleheaders. . . .  Basically we occupy 
most of the 5:30 [p.m.] to 8:00 [p.m.] slots in the first 
quarter and usually at least one other, either 12:30 [p.m.] 
or 1:00 [p.m.] to 3:30 [p.m.], or 3:30 [p.m.] to 6:00 
[p.m.] . . .  So you [receive] that information then there are 
just certain things you know. For a 1:00 game on a 
Sunday afternoon you know you are basically limited to 
the east[ern] and central time zones.  So you look to see 
what buildings are available on that particular Sunday.  
Is . . . [Madison Square] Garden available?  Is Miami 
available?  Is Chicago available?  Is Detroit available, 
etc.?  And the flip side of what buildings are available, is 
what teams are available to travel?  If a team isnt 
available, [if] it doesnt have a building available to play a 
home game, then by definition [it is] available to play a 
road game. . . .  [T]hat is the basic pattern.  Then it 
becomes [a matter of] assembling this mosaic. . . .  [The 
factors include] last year in the playoffs the Knicks and 
Miami was a great matchup, there is a rivalry there, [there 
is a] slot from 1:00 [p.m.] to 3:30 [p.m.] and . . . Miami 
arena [is available].  Are the Knicks available to play in 
Miami that day? . . .  [If] they are . . . [that step is] 
done. . . .  [T]rying to come up with . . . compelling 
matchups and assembling the network schedule is the first 
part of the process because after that . . . [if] the Knicks 
are in Miami Sunday afternoon, then you . . . create the 
road trip around it. . . .  [If] Orlando is free on Friday 
night, well have them play in Orlando Friday, and Miami 
on Sunday and maybe Monday night.  Since its not the 
next day per se, they could play in Atlanta, so theres a 
nice little road trip . . . [and that step is done].87 
 The scenario of the national television schedule dictating the 
overall NBA schedule as described by Desser can be applied using 
the 2000-01 NBA schedule, most notably with the 1999-2000 
 
 87 Desser, supra note 53. 
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defending NBA Champion Los Angeles Lakers.  On three separate 
occasions, the Los Angeles Lakers road schedule is strongly 
coordinated with the NBA on national television (See Table One). 
Table One - Los Angeles Lakers 2000-01 Television Coordinated 
Road Schedule 
Day   Date   Opponent                    National Network 
Sun   1/28     New York Knicks      NBC 
Tue   1/30     Cleveland 
Wed     1/31     Minnesota                  TNT 
Tue   2/13     New Jersey 
Wed   2/14     Philadelphia               TNT 
Fri   2/16     Charlotte 
Sun   2/18     Indiana                       NBC 
Wed    3/14     Detroit 
Fri   3/16     Washington 
Sun   3/18     Orlando                      NBC 
Mon   3/19     Atlanta 
Wed   3/21     Milwaukee                 TNT 
  (Source: NBA) 
 Through this scenario, the networks are receiving the most 
desirable NBA product for their broadcasts: competitive teams 
featuring the top players in the league. 
 Problems could arise between franchises as certain teams are 
obviously on national television more than others.  Teams such as 
New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago might receive national 
exposure often, but through the NBA broadcast agreements, each 
team receives the same amount of national television revenue.  Dave 
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Checketts, former President and CEO of Madison Square Garden,88 
explains the situation: 
We dont forget about the fact that we get a major share of 
the national revenue.  [However] . . . we get 1/29th of the 
national revenue and our marketplace probably accounts 
for 1/7th of the watching audience. . . .  [I]f we were to 
really argue that case, we would say we deserve much 
more than 1/29th and so you shouldnt put the Knicks on 
national television any more than you do anyone else. . . .  
[T]he truth is they put the Knicks on . . . as many times as 
they possibly can, because we do have such interest in 
New York.89 
 The rights fees from the leagues broadcast partners represent the 
single largest source of shared revenue among the twenty-nine NBA 
franchises.  These franchises, in essence, have agreed not to compete 
with one another in the area of broadcasting.  In a free open market 
and each team having permission to negotiate their own national 
television contract, strong franchises from large media markets such 
as the New York Knicks or Los Angeles Lakers would easily earn 
more money than franchises in smaller markets such as the 
Sacramento Kings or the Memphis Grizzlies.  The greater revenue 
could easily alter the scales of competitive balance between all of the 
teams with large market teams being able to sign more high-priced 
talent.  The rationale for the revenue sharing of the NBA is 
commented on in Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship and WGN Contl 
Broad. Co. v. NBA: 
It is not disputed, and it is plain from the financial figures, 
that the prosperity of the  league currently depends on the 
volume  of  the  shared revenues generated by the  leagues 
economic  activity on  behalf of the teams and particularly  
 
 88 Madison Square Garden houses three professional sports franchises: the New York 
Knicks (NBA), the New York Liberty (WNBA), and the New York Rangers (NHL). 
 89 Interview with Dave Checketts, Former President & CEO, Madison Square Garden 
(Oct. 16, 1998). 
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on the revenues generated by the broadcast contracts with 
the national networks.90 
 Ed Desser comments on the league revenue sharing ideas and the 
importance of these objectives in the overall operation of the NBA, 
stating how the revenue aspects of this play into issues of 
competitive balance.   
There are a whole variety of systems that are designed to 
help maintain the integrity and quality of the product.  It 
goes beyond just how it is televised or how it is 
presented. . . .  Milwaukee and San Antonio collect the 
same amount of network television revenue as the Knicks 
and the Lakers [in order to give] them the same number of 
chips, or close to the same number of chips, to play with 
as they compete for talent.91 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the federal 
government permits the NBA, at the expense of individual teams, to 
systematically maintain control over national television exposure of 
its games.  The philosophy of the federal government is clear: 
professional sports leagues are unique and deserving of special 
legislation like the SBA of 1961, which allows the league to pool the 
broadcast rights to their games to the highest television network 
bidder.  Once this right to collectively package and sell the rights to 
games has been granted, sports leagues now have their greatest 
source of revenue. 
 In addition to unmatched revenue, television provides unmatched 
exposure.  The NBA policy of television exposure is if not dictated 
by, at least permissible, through both legislative and judicial 
government guidelines as expressed in the arguments that are a result 
of Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Pship and WGN Contl Broad. Co. v. 
 
 90 NBA, 754 F. Supp. at 1340. 
 91 Desser, supra note 53. 
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NBA and its progeny.  The NBA, and not individual teams, must 
have the ability to control the overall television exposure of its 
games in order to maintain the value of national television rights 
contracts.  The NBAs extensive litigation in the WGN case, 
particularly since it essentially focused on five games of the Chicago 
Bulls, was illustrative of the league exerting its right to maintain 
economic value and control exposure of national television.  Once 
league-wide control is permitted, the NBA and its broadcast partners 
can then create a schedule of teams and games that is the most 
appealing to the national television audience. 
 
